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The Propensity of Advanced Free World
Economies to Import Steel
by PeterJ. B. Steele*

INTRODUCTION

THE

THEME OF this conference is the dumping of steel into Canada

and the United States. The theme of this paper is the propensity of steelproducing countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)' to import steel. The choice of a general subject matter
for the paper as opposed to the specific emphasis of the conference is quite
deliberate.
First, the term "dumping" implies, at the very least, the release of goods
onto foreign markets at prices which do not reflect the true cost of producing
and exporting them, with a view to making sales by thus putting local producers at an unfair competitive disadvantage. Usually, a determination of
dumping is made when export prices are below home market prices. Dumping also carries with it the notion of the domestic industry suffering positive
damage as the result of such practices. As such, it can be a useful term to
condemn all imports which compete effectively with local products and thus
inconvenience local producers. A prime example of this latter attitude was
provided in the United Kingdom by a certain Labour member of Parliament,
commenting recently on the possibility of a Japanese manufacturer setting up
a plant in the United Kingdom to assemble lorries. He asked for such a move
to be opposed on the grounds that the Japanese could sell their products in
the United Kingdom at £3,000 below the British Leyland price, and that this
was manifestly unfair competition. This typifies the thinking-or should I say
the gut reaction-that bedevils the whole question of competitive imports and
the appropriate response to them.
To return, however, to my apologia for not discussing dumping at this
particular conference, whether it is used in its strict legal sense or as a vague
word to damn certain kinds of activity, the votion of dumping begs many
questions, the answers to which can often differ according to whether they
are considered from the viewpoint of the exporter or the domestic producer
which is displaced. It seemed better for the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
as a dispassionate observer, therefore, to avoid taking a stand on the issue in
* Manager, Market Research Division, Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., London,
England. This paper was delivered at the Canada-United States Law Institutes Conference on
Steel Dumping into Canada and the United States, held September 29 & 30, 1978, at the University of Western Ontario, London.
IThe Member States of the OECD are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
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particular cases, and to consider imports of steel and the reasons for them in
general terms.
Second, it seemed worthwhile at this initial stage to consider particularly
high levels of steel imports as a problem not for the industries in Canada and
the United States alone, but as one that can affect the business of steelmakers
in any country where steel consumers are, to a greater or lesser extent, free
from official direction in the selection of the sources of their supplies. The
OECD countries include all the countries which combine steel production
with reasonably liberal trade policies- certainly the most important of
them-hence the use of this term, umbrella-fashion, to define the countries
covered by the review. Needless to say, not all OECD countries have steel industries, and not all OECD countries with steel industries suffer extensively
from imports. Therefore, this paper will be largely concerned, first, with
identifying countries which seem particularly prone to import large quantities
of steel both in absolute terms and in relation to their total consumption, and
to determine the internal reasons for this weakness-if weakness it is-and,
second, to indicate the main sources of such imports, and discuss how such
countries are able to compete so successfully on the world market, without at
the same time attempting to tackle the essentially legal question of unfair
practices. To some extent the enquiry will be historical, but attention will be
focused mainly on the background to the present crisis of the steel industry in
Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America, as well as addressing likely
future developments.
Trends in Steel Demand
Dumping, however that term is defined, is usually associated with a
market situation in which there is an excess of international production
capacity in relation to the demands made upon it, with the consequent temptation to manufacturers to lower their prices in order to increase their market
share and thus maintain capacity utilisation. This temptation is stronger in
the case of steelmakers than with most other industrialists, partly because the
bulk of the basic material-crude steel-is produced in very large units,
which means that it is difficult to adjust demand to output merely by closing
down plant. Furthermore, the nature of steel production is such that if a
smelter has to be taken out of commission, the supporting blast furnaces,
coke ovens and other auxiliary equipment also have to be run down or shut
down-the latter usually involving the collapse of expensive refractory linings- and iron ore and coal has to be stockpiled. In other words, the steel industry is very capital intensive and the inducement to maintain production as
long as fixed costs can be covered is high. It seems appropriate, therefore, to
begin by examining the demand factors underlying the present weakness of
the market.
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CHART I
TRENDS IN THE CONSUMPTION OF FINISHED STEEL IN MAJOR
OECD ECONOMIES
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Chart I illustrates in graphic terms trends in steel consumption by the
major steel consuming nations in the OECD group -the United States, Japan,
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada. The main feature
of the steel market as revealed by this chart is the similarity in the patterns of
demand-trend in each country. From 1964 to 1974, the pattern is generally
one of growth, subject to cyclical fluctuations. In 1974 and 1975 demand
plummets in all countries in quite an unprecedented manner. In 1976 and
1977 demand recovers, although the ground lost in the previous years is by no
means made up. It may be deduced from this that, even though demand
grows at different rates in different countries, the steel market is ultimately
subject to international pressures, and the extent to which individual country
markets can vary the timing of their response to such pressures is limited.
The major influence on steel demand arises from the nature of the
material and the uses to which it is put. The distinctive qualities of the metal
are its high impact strength and its excellent ductile and tensile properties.
This means that upon impact it does not break, shatter or easily distort, and
that it can be rolled into shapes and subjected to temporary or continuous
tensions without its ability to perform being seriously affected. In short,
without dwelling too long on this matter, it is an unmatched engineering raw
material, no other substance offering this combination of properties can to
the same degree- certainly not at a comparable price-compete with it across
the full range of its end uses, although many, such as aluminum, copper,
iron, wood, plastics, concrete, etc., can compete in specific areas. It is impossible to imagine the modern world without this versatile metal which has
so many applications in every sector of economic activity, ranging from
mechanical and structural engineering to packaging. It is not too much to say
that it is a basic raw material of industrial civilisation and, as industrial
development is the main factor underlying all significant economic development, it is reasonable to presume, prima facie, a very close relationship between economic growth and steel consumption.
Demand for steel is, of course, directly dependent on the behavior of the
various sectors of the market it serves. This market may be divided into the
following broad sectors:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

consumer durables (motor cars, washing machines, etc.);
packaging (cans, drums, etc.);
capital equipment (lorries, ships, industrial machinery);
infrastructuralinvestment (construction generally, transport and
communications systems, public service equipment, etc); and
defence equipment.

The relative importance of these various sectors tends to vary from country to country. In the older industrialised countries of the OECD, consumer
durables manufacture, particularly of private motor vehicles, is the major
consumer 'of steel, whereas in Communist countries capital equipment, infrastructural investment and defence equipment absorb proportionally larger
amounts of the total, and in the "Third World, "infrastructural investment is

1979]

STEEL DUMPING CONFERENCE

21

usually the major end use sector. Nevertheless, in every country the general
health of the economy is ultimately linked to the level of activity in these industrial sectors and vice versa. This claim is made in full awareness of the increasing importance of the contributions of service sectors to total economic
activity in all OECD countries. It is still true to say, however, that the health
of the service sectors depends to a very considerable extent on the behavior of
industrial sectors, insofar as the latter are purchasers of services such as banking, insurance, haulage, shipping, etc., or are creators of the wealth which
governments and citizens spend on other types of services. To link the health
of the industrial sectors with the health of the economy as a whole seems
quite unexceptionable in general terms.
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CHART II
RELATIONSHIP OF ANNUAL CHANGES IN STEEL CONSUMPTION AND
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FROM 1964 To 1977
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To return to the theme, there are strong arguments in favor of a close
relationship between steel consumption and industrial output. These
arguments are reinforced by the fact that it is possible to demonstrate a
reasonably close mathematical relationship between the two. If industrial output, ', moves by so many points, steel consumption, '', will usually move in
the region by so many points. Chart II plots annual changes in steel consumption between 1964 and 1977 against similar changes in industrial production in the case of a number of major steel using countries. For each
country the line of regression is also calculated. Without going into the
mathematics involved, it is sufficient to say that if there were perfect correlations between the two factors, the points resulting from the plotting of '
against y' for each year would all lie on the single line of regression. In fact,
the points tend to be scattered on either side of the line of regression,
although in close enough relationship to support the logical hypothesis that
the one factor does strongly influence the other.
In considering these diagrams, I would draw your attention in particular
to the balance of the points on either side of the regression lines, which is
highly suggestive of a long-term mathematical relationship, albeit with yearly
fluctuations. The relationship is particularly pronounced in the case of Germany and the United Kingdom, less so far Japan and the United States.
Leaving aside the effect of variations in the way the data are collected in
each country, I would hazard the opinion that the greater fluctuations in the
case of Japan reflect the effects of steel-intensive, export-oriented industries,
which maintain a higher level of output in the down-turns in the industrial
cycle than industries more oriented to serving the domestic market. With
regard to the United States, I suspect that the fluctuations here are at least in
part due to the fact that United States industrial output is less steel-intensive
than in other Free World economies because it is more developed. Nevertheless, in both these countries a major mathematical relationship between
steel consumption and industrial production is manifest.
Having, I hope, persuaded you to accept this as a working hypothesis, I
should like to consider the consequences of the relationship for the world steel
market. Industrial production as the main element in general economic activity is subject to broad international forces, insofar as all modem
economies-certainly in the Free World-exist largely by taking in each
other's washing. To use a more precise analogy, in the words of St. Paul, the
comity of nations are all "members one of another." Necessary imports have
to be paid for by exports, and exports depend on the ability of recipients to
pay for them, i.e., on their level of economic activity. The cycles of economic
activity have, therefore, tended to be international in their manifestation, the
pace being set by the major free economy, that of the United States, although
in recent years Japan and Germany have become increasingly important in
this respect.
The international character of industrial activity explains, therefore, the
common characteristics of the consumption patterns in the major steel using
countries, that is, why demand tends to be strong or weak at about the same
time everywhere. This is particularly evidenced by the virtually simultaneous
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collapse in steel consumption in the period 1974 to 1975 and by the sluggish
nature of its recovery since then, which can be related to the general
economic recession, the immediate cause of which was the energy crisis of
1973 to 1975.
The consequences for the supply situation, including imports, of the international character of the steel demand cycle and, in particular, the slow
recovery of the OECD steel market since the end of 1974 must now be considered.
IMPORTS OF STEEL INTO

OECD

COUNTRIES

The Pattern of the Trade
The pattern of imports into OECD countries has the following established
characteristics:
(1) The greatest part of the finished steel imported by OECD
Member Countries taken together comes from other OECD
sources. In each year between 1965 and 1975, the proportion
of the total originating from such sources was consistently over
ninety percent. Although full data are not available, there is no
reason to believe that there was any subsequent significant
decline in this proportion. Of the non-OECD sources, the most
important collectively were the Soviet bloc countries, although
in recent years sources such as South Africa, Brazil and the
Republic of Korea have become more important.
(2) Within the OECD market, the largest market for imported
steel is provided by the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC). In fact, by far the greater part of its imports
represent inter-Community transfers. It should be noted,
however, that whereas in 1975 about seventy-six percent of total
ECSC imports were of this nature, in 1976 and 1977 the
proportions were seventy-one percent and sixty-nine percent
respectively. The other main sources were the other European
OECD members, taken together, followed by Japan and the
Soviet bloc. Tonnages from South Africa and Third World
countries were relatively small, but nevertheless significant in
what they foreshadowed.
(3) The second largest flow of trade is into the United States,
originating in Japan and the ECSC group. Unlike the ECSC
group, the United States is not a substantial supplier of
OECD markets.
(4) In relation to its total consumption of steel, Canada is also
a substantial importer. The largest single source is the United
States, with whom its trade is roughly in balance. It is,
however, a net importer from Japan and the ECSC.
(5) Japan is the main single source of imports within the OECD
group. Its inward trade is negligible. The ECSC collectively
is as important a source as Japan. Unlike Japan, however,
as already noted, its members take substantial imports from
Third World countries.
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Taking this as the pattern of trade in steel imports in the OECD, it
becomes obvious that the principal necessity in any consideration of the propensity of advanced Free World economies to import steel is an examination
of the ECSC and the United States as importers and the ECSC and Japan as
exporters.
Imports and the Net Supply of Steel
It is important to bear in mind that imports have long formed a substantial proportion of the total supplies of steel coming onto the market in nearly
all the major consuming countries. They are, in other words, part of a settled
pattern, not an aberration. In part, of course, this reflects exchanges of steel
between steelmakers themselves for further processing and finishing. Even excluding this element, however, and taking account of only finished steel sold
to steel users, the fact remains that imports comprise a substantial proportion of total domestic steel supplies.

CHART III
STEEL IMPORTS As A PROPORTION OF NET SUPPLIES
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A consideration of the seven largest finished steel consumers -the United
States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy 'and Canada
which, with the exception of Japan, are also the largest steel importers, shows
that in the period 1975 to 1977, only in the case of Japan were imports a
negligible proportion of net supplies. (See Chart III and Table I) There is,
admittedly, an overall upward trend, but this is most pronounced in the case
of France and Germany where it mainly reflects the growing interdependence of what might be called the innter-ECSC bloc; those countries
bordering on Europe's industrial heartland on the lower Rhine. The United
Kingdom also has become markedly more dependent on imports, but this
mainly reflects the special circumstances of the 1970's, when for various
reasons the United Kingdom had to import a great deal of finished steel, such
as large diameter pipe for the oil extraction industry and sheet for the
automotive industry.
More significant than the perceptible overall growth of imports over the
period as a whole has been the marked upturn seen in the case of most
countries during the present recession. Although in most cases this only
represents a return to the relative levels prevailing before the'1973 to 1974
boom, it is still a curious trend in view of the weakness of the market already
noted, being altogether disproportionate to the recovery which has taken
place. In the United States for instance, where the net supply of finished steel
increased by 13.6% over the previous year in 1976 and by 7.9% in 1977, imports increased by 13.3% in 1976, which was about what would be expected,
but by 24.1% in 1977, which meant the domestic industry's share of its own
market was being seriously eroded.
The record considered here poses two questions:
(1)
(2)

Why do countries with sophisticated steel industries import substantial quantities of steel, most of which could be supplied
from local resources?
Why did imports tend to increase in relative terms-and often
absolutely-in the period of recession after 1974?

To deal with the first question, there seems to be four basic reasons why
steel producing countries import steel:
(1)

the inadequacy of the supply of a particular material in one
country, which can be a permanent or a temporary factor;
(2) the wish of some consumers to vary their sources of supply;
(3) the greater convenience of relying on external sources which are
geographically closer than sources within the country itself, or
provide better service; or
(4) the lower prices for imported steel.
These factors vary in their relative importance according to the country concerned and the period under consideration. In Germany and France, both of
which depend on other EEC sources for the greater part of their imported
supplies, convenience and price are the main considerations. It is often more
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convenient for consumers in Northern France, for instance, to take supplies
from Germany or Luxembourg than from Lorraine or Provence, and the
basing-point price system operating in all ECSC countries can mean that the
prices are lower as well. Germany, in particular, also takes substantial tonnages from Eastern Europe. To some extent this reflects the lower prices of
materials from this area, but Germany is also understood to take some steel
for further processing or in payment for earlier capital goods sales to Soviet
bloc countries.
The imports of Italy and the United Kingdom are also to a large extent
explained by their European location and their membership in the ECSC. In
the case of the United Kingdom, however, it has become a tradition of the
automotive industry to rely on overseas sources for at least a proportion of its
supplies of cold-reduced sheet for car bodies. The inability of the British Steel
Corporation (BSC) to supply this material has been a major factor in the absolute growth of imports in recent years-BSC has had to import hot-rolled
coil for re-rolling and cold-reduced sheet for direct supply to its customers.
The imports of the United States and Canada from Japan and the ECSC
have been inspired by all the factors outlined above. In many West Coast
locations, for instance, supplies from Japan may be more readily available
than materials from the main domestic steelmaking areas. Some Japanese
products are said to be of superior quality because they are made on more
up-to-date equipment, although the overall importance of this factor is
uncertain. There is also the exchange of material between Canada and the
United States resulting from their proximity and the close commercial links of
those countries. There is no doubt, however, that price-competitiveness has
always been the main factor underlying the bulk of the imports into North
America from both the ECSC countries and Japan. To some extent, the ability
of these countries to compete with local producers in terms of price has
reflected their willingness to price their products aggressively, while the
tendency in the United States has always been to reduce output in the face of
weakening demand. (This does not mean, of course, that importers have failed
to service the United States market during times of high demand- an accusation often levelled against them. An examination of historical statistics suggests that the only period when imports failed to increase during the up-cycles
of the United States market was in 1973 to 1974. This was probably due to
the fact that the action of the United States Government in imposing wage
and price controls had the effect of holding domestic prices below world
levels at that time. The effect of this is illustrated by a ninety-six percent increase in United States exports at this time of peak home demand.) The point
I am trying to make is that trade of this nature is a permanent feature of the
world steel market and, as such, is acceptable if not always welcome to local
producers. In the period before 1974, only when some imports threatened to
drive local producers from some specific section of the market were there objections and demands for artifical protection. This occurred in the case of the
United States special steel industry in the late 1960's, when it seems the
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Japanese and some others made this a target for low-cost exports and had
taken up a very substantial proportion of the market before the government
arranged voluntary quotas with the importers in 1968.
The general increase in imports in 1976 and 1977, at a time when
markets were only slowly recovering from the recession of 1974 to 1975,
presented problems of an entirely different magnitude. In general terms, the
flood of imports can be explained, of course, as a classic response to a situation in which the availability of supplies exceeds the requirement for them:
Producers are tempted to put material onto the international market at very
low prices which producers in individual domestic markets find very difficult
to match. As already suggested, the capital intensive nature of steel production creates a peculiar incentive for steelmakers to adopt this approach. This
leads us to consider the actual situation of the OECD market in this period,
and, in particular, the extent of under-utilisation of capacity. It is difficult to
measure capacity-utilisation on a standard basis for all countries. By applying
standards uniform to each country or producing area, however, it is possible
to say that utilisation in the ECSC, the United States and Japan ranged from
eighty-five to ninety-five percent for most of the period from 1960 to 1973, climbing even higher in the boom of 1973 to 1974. In the recession of 1975 to 1976
it fell very substantially, as indicated in TablelII. Data for 1977 are not yet
available for all the countries, but it is known that in the ECSC the average
rate of utilisation in that year was not far above sixty percent. A report to the
European Parliament in the middle of 1977 recorded that as a consequence
of the low level of usage, jobs were being lost at the rate of 3,000 per month
and 100,000 men were on short-time. The political temptation in this situation to export at any price merely to maintain employment can be easily
understood. More significant, however, is the pressure it generates for the introduction of measures to reduce the level of imports.

TABLE II
RATE OF UTILISATION OF CRUDE STEEL PRODUCTION CAPACITY

ECSC

1960
95.6

1965
85.0

1970
87.9

1973
86.3

1974
97.0

1975
66.1

1976
67.8

United States

. . .

88.0

86.0

96.0

94.0

76.2

(80.1)

Japan

(88)

86.8

90.6

92.1

85.9

65.1

(71.1)

Source: OECD and other sources.

The reasons for this low level of utilisation reflected, of course, the
understandable failure of those who were responsible for steel investment
decisions in the 1960's and 1970's to foresee the recession of the mid-1970's
and its consequences for steel demand. Other factors were, however, tending
to exacerbate the situation. First, the Japanese and ECSC industries, in planning new capacity, had usually built-in a margin intended for the export
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market. They therefore had to face the consequences of recession not only in
their domestic markets, but also in overseas markets. Second, in the ECSC
the tendency during the 1960's had been to develop relatively large works at
coastal sites. This new capacity did not, however, replace the older existing
capacity, but was superimposed upon it, reflecting the reluctance of governments to countenance the creation of massive redundancies, usually in regions
where unemployment was already at a high level. This created particular problems in the United Kingdom, but was common to all ECSC Member Countries to a greater or lesser extent. Japan, on the other hand, had always tended to scrap obsolescent capacity, no doubt secure in the knowledge that the
workforce could be absorbed elsewhere in new plant. The United States industry also was far less hesitant to run down out-dated plant. The situation
created by the high level of unused domestic capacity in the ECSC, Japan
and the United States was exacerbated, at least as far as the ECSC and Japan
were concerned, by the downturn in domestic demand in smaller producing countries such as Australia, South Africa and Spain, which encouraged
them to increase their pressure on world markets. This was augmented by
competition from new sources, notably the Republic of Korea and Brazil. At
the same time, demand also was reduced in non-steelmaking countries where
Japan and the ECSC had been accustomed to finding much of their export
markets.
As already implied, the excess supply of steel tended to exert considerable
downward pressure on prices, both in the world market and, less directly, in
domestic markets.
The Effect on Prices
The best indicators for world steel prices are usually taken to be those
published in MetalBulletin which refer to products sold by ECSC producers onto
the world market. It seems a reasonable assumption that these products
would have to be at least competitive with products from other major sources.
Chart IV illustrates the trend in prices of cold-rolled coil and universal beams based on quotations in Metal Bulletin in recent years, taking two
reference points per year.
Although the references are not complete, it can be seen how closely
prices tended to firm in those periods when demand was also strong and
decline when demand fell away. Thus, they were on a rising trend during the
cyclical upturn of 1972 to 1974, fell away to low levels with the onset of the
recession, firmed up with the recovery, especially in the United States in 1975
to 1976, and fell away again when the rate of recovery of the market declined
in the latter part of 1977. The recovery since then reflects in part the decline
of the value of the dollar against other major currencies; there has been no
marked upturn in steel demand which could have influenced prices, although
this was expected. On the other hand, the introduction of the United States
trigger price mechanism (TPM) system in April 1978, and the cut back in
Japanese production which was, in part, due to TPM, could have played its
part in this trend.
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CHART IV
TRENDS IN STEEL PRICES: DOLLARS PER METRIC TON
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Chart IV also shows basing-point prices for ECSC home sales. These are,
in fact, rather misleading, as ECSC suppliers were permitted to align their
prices downward to match those of imports, so that for major products like
coil and universal beams the actual differential between home and import
prices would have been less pronounced. The result of this was the introduction of schemes to hold up domestic prices by cartelising the market and also
the introduction of minimum guidance prices, and, in the case of some products, mandatory prices. At this time, the ECSC schemes to maintain
domestic prices do not seem to be having much success, and the ECSC price
levels shown in Chart IV are more reflective of wishful thinking than of the
actual situation.
In the United States, it has been the general practice for steeimakers to
cut back production rather than reduce prices. Thus, in current market
terms, there is rarely any fallback such as has been noted in the case of the
ECSC. On the other hand, apart from the unsettling effect of plant closures,
it is generally recognised that import competition tends to hold down the
level of prices, preventing increases necessitated by increases in production
costs. I understand that United States domestic prices have firmed considerably as a result of TPM and the upturn in local demand.
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Japan also has been affected by the downward pressure on prices exerted
by excess production, although no foreign steelmaker can compete with
Japanese suppliers in their own market. It would seem as though demand was
sufficiently strong to maintain the prices for sheet, plate and heavy sections,
but it has been estimated that in the early months of 1977, producers were
losing sixty dollars on each ton of small sections sold on the home market. It
was pressure of this sort which encouraged producers to intensify their aggressive export market policies. (It is worth noting however, the findings of
the United States President's Council on Wage and Price Stability that, in
general terms, Japanese realised export prices remained above home market
prices even in 1976. Prices for shipments to the United States also increased
in the first half of 1977.) Nevertheless, the recession now has been going on
for a long time, and it is possible that the aggressive selling which obviously
was a short-term measure in a normal cyclical downturn is not acceptable as
a continuing policy. The Japanese have been exporting something like forty
percent of their output in recent years, and it is my very private view that it
is this factor as much as anything else that has caused them to turn their export market drive this year. I find evidence of this in their obvious willingness
in the last eighteen months to enter into voluntary quota agreements with
both the ECSC and the United States.
The Reaction to the Cheap Import Onslaught
The recession in steel demand in 1974 to 1975 and its limited recovery
since then have served to emphasise the problems of the steel industries in the
ECSC and the United States. The inability of both to compete with the
Japanese industry has been starkly displayed and, certainly in Europe, the
need to close down obsolete capacity for good has been clearly demonstrated.
All the governments involved have shown themselves reluctant to increase
the protection against import competition already enjoyed by their domestic
industry. To consider first the ECSC, several factors seem to have been involved in formulating official opinion:
(1)
(2)

(3)

the general commitment of ECSC governments to liberal
trading policies under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT);
the fear that blatantly protectionist measures would start a trade
war covering not only steel products but also products containing steel (perhaps half of all manufactured goods traded
include steel); and
an acknowledgement that protection would relieve the pressure
to do something about the manifest inefficiencies of the
steel industries.

Counterbalancing this is the understandable wish of the European governments to ease the pain of eliminating as many as 200,000 jobs, which is
necessary if the industries there are to take full advantage of the introduction
of modern technology. There is also the usually unspoken fear that if the
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ECSC is exposed to the full blast of foreign competition, the change in the
balance of imports to total net supplies could involve the loss of as many as
100,000 more jobs.
In the United States, the government has tended to adopt attitudes
towards the steel industry which, if not motivated by actual hostility, have
had much the same effect. Anti-pollution legislation has, for instance, borne
particularly heavily on the industry and has added to the problem of financing capital replacement programs. Successive administrations also have been
reluctant to countenance steel price increases, regarding these as a primary
cause of inflation. This hereditary attitude alone would probably have made
the administration reluctant to yield to pressures for protection against lowpriced steel imports, even without its formal obligations under GATT. The
wish to protect established patterns of employment also has been less pressing
than with European governments. In fact, traditionally, the only necessity the
United States Government has seemed to recognise with respect to shielding
the steel industry against imports has been that of maintaining United States
industrial capacity in certain strategic areas-as in the case of special steels
already noted.
The protection given to the steel industries in the ECSC and the United
States has, therefore, usually been limited. In Europe, tariffs range between
four to eight percent and in the United States between six to thirteen percent.
The highest duties are attached to high value products, while for lower value
bulk steel products the chief protection has been that afforded by the cost of
shipping them. This however, has become an increasingly fragile shield
against Japanese competition. It will be recalled that last autumn the United
States President's Council on Wage and Price Stability found that Japanese
steelmakers could export profitably, absorbing transport and tariff costs, and
still undercut American producers by five percent in the United States
market. Since then, the devaluation of the dollar against the yen has probably reduced this advantage, although it is understood that it also has
substantially reduced the raw material costs of the Japanese.
Other protective measures in recent years have included the voluntary
agreements regulating exports. In the periods 1968 to 1972 and 1972 to 1974,
ECSC and Japanese producers accepted quotas for the import of stainless
steel, tool steel and other alloy steels into the United States. In 1975, Japan
agreed to limit its exports of steel into the ECSC. Again, in 1976, the United
States agreed to quotas on special steel imports with Japan. Other suppliers,
who refused voluntary agreements-including the ECSC, Sweden and
Austria-liad them imposed by the United States Government. The effectiveness of these agreements is, however, doubted by steelmakers in Europe
and the United States. The 1976 agreement with the ECSC reduced Japanese
imports in that year to 1.5 million tons from 1.6 million tons in 1975.
Japanese exports to non-ECSC European countries, however, rose from 2.4
million to 3.6 million tons, and ECSC steelmakers suspected that much of this
material eventually found its way into their markets. (Spanish exports to the
ECSC, for instance, increased from about 500,000 tons in 1975 to over
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900,000 tons in 1976.) In the United States it is understood that the Japanese
would willingly have guaranteed sales at 1976 levels in 1977, but United
States steelmakers were naturally reluctant to see the Japanese consolidate in
this way the gains they had made in 1976.
The year 1977 saw the steel industries in both the United States and the
ECSC making increasing use of existing antidumping legislation. In the
United States in particular, test cases showed that this might be a more effective remedy than had previously been suspected. European exports appeared
particularly at risk, partly because it was common knowledge that the ECSC
industry was far less efficient than the Japanese, and partly because the ECSC
Commission was trying to maintain domestic prices at levels above those obtained for exports to the United States.
It is suggested that it was this trend, to make increasing use of the antidumping acts, that forced the United States Government into a more protectionist posture in order to forestall a wider threat to its attempts to negotiate
more orderly trading agreements with other major steel producers under
GATT. It would appear that this is the broad strategic aim of both the
North American and ECSC governments.
It seems likely that the preference of the United States Government
would be an arrangement limiting exports along the lines of the GATT
multi-fibre agreement for the textile industry, although such an agreement
would be considerably more complicated in the case of steel, because of the
sheer numbers of products involved. It also would have been far too rigid. In
Europe, there seems to be some pressure in favor of a World Steel Conference
to cartelise steel trade. Already such a system had begun to operate within
Europe under the so-called Simonet Plan, under which the EEC Commission
makes short-term market forecasts and then divides the market amongst the
major steelmakers in a cartel known as Eurofer.
The weakness of both these approaches was that their effective application would inevitably be delayed, while by the Autumn of 1977 more immediate action was necessary to reduce the flow of imports and yet protect
the principles of free trade in steel. The result was the adoption by the
United States Government of the Report of the Treasury Task Force, headed
by Anthony Solomon, which involved the introduction, after a short period,
of a trigger price mechanism. This action effectively by-passed the fear of the
Europeans that protective measures would encourage retaliatory action
against their exports in the United States, and the second phase of the
Davignon Plan was introduced in December 1977, just in time for Christmas.
I suspect that others following me will wish to discuss the United States
TPM and its Canadian counterpart, so I will not dwell on it here. Under the
Davignon Plan, the ECSC introduced reference prices for major steel products for a period of three months, based upon the practice of the most efficient foreign producers, i.e., the Japanese. Imports priced below these levels
were subject to antidumping measures. The import prices were established at
an average of seven percent below internal minimum prices, and ECSC
steelmakers were not permitted to align downward to compete with them.
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Behind this screen, the ECSC negotiated bilateral agreements with the main
suppliers-Japan, Spain, South Africa, Brazil, the Republic of Korea and
Sweden-to limit their share of the market to agreed levels, such agreements
then taking the place of instant antidumping action. (I understand that most
East European countries have yet to negotiate agreements with the ECSC.
This lack of agreement and the reluctance of the West German government
to take tough counter-measures are probably the main weaknesses of this
aspect of the Davignon Plan.) Thus, almost in spite of themselves, the
authorities in two of the three major OECD steel markets were forced by the
circumstances of 1977 to take action to protect their steel industries against
low-priced imports.
Conclusions and Future Outlook
My purpose in this paper has been to demonstrate that imports constituted a significant proportion of the net supplies of steel to major OECD
steel-consuming countries-other than Japan-for many years and, as such,
were not a threat tq the position of local industries. The growth in the
volume of low-cost imports in the years since the oil crisis recession, and
especially in the last couple of years, has, on the other hand, created severe
problems for the industries in the two major importing economies, the ECSC
group and the United States. While the immediate cause of this flood of imports was the general weakness of demand in all the industrially-advanced
Free World economies, I have attempted to argue that the vulnerability of
these industries was a consequence in part of internal structural defects and
in part of developments in the world steel market, both of which would have
created problems that eventually would have confronted them. These factors
may be summarised as follows:
(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)

the need of the Japanese steel industry to find a market
for about ninety-five million tons of finished steel, with domestic
requirements reduced from nearly eighty million tons in 1973 to
a little over sixty million tons in 1975, rising to sixty-seven
million tons in 1977;
the inability of the ECSC and North American industries to
compete with materials exported by the more efficient and lower
cost Japanese industry in their own markets. (This competitive
edge has been eroded in the case of exports to the United
States);
the excess steelmaking capacity in the ECSC protected from rationalisation by social considerations; and
the reduction of traditional markets for ECSC steel as a result of
recession and the development of local industries in many
countries, all of which became more serious competitors in the
ECSC home market.

It can be seen that if this analysis of the present situation of the world
steel trade is accepted, the flood of low-priced steel imports in 1976 and 1977
was not a cause, but a symptom of the malaise of the United States and
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ECSC markets. By repressing the symptoms, the fundamental malaise is not
cured; at best, conditions are created in which the malaise can be subjected
to less drastic treatment.
There remains the consideration of whether the protection given the
European, the American and the Canadian steel industries at the end of
1977 has worked, or, in view of the shortness of the time involved, whether it
looks like it is working. This is a difficult question and I, like the Scottish
divine confronted with the doctrine of predestination, am tempted, having
faced the problem squarely, to move on. Balking at such a cavalier approach
however, I consider it most appropriate to proceed by considering what alternatives were available:
(1) Doing nothing (always a tempting formula). By the end of
1977, the volume of exports in both the ECSC countries and
North America had reached such levels that all except the
most perfervid free trade advocates were convinced that the very
bases of the steel industries in these areas were threatened.
(2) Leaving it to the private initiation of existing antidumping
legislation. This course was already being pursued with some
success in North America by mid-1977. Two major objections
could, however, be raised:
(a) it threatened the grand strategy of all the governments
hoping to achieve some effective control over trade flows
within the confines of GATT; and
(b) there was no way of knowing whether it would succeed
in reducing the volume of imports and restoring prices.
This latter point, I maintain, must be the basic object of
antidumping measures; if it is not achieved, all the rest is
little more than "a sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal."
To move from the sublime to the profane, the same criticisms can, I think,
be laid against protecting markets by relying on antidumping legislation as
Lord Chesterfield once made of the active pursuit of Venus. You will recall
his words: "The position is ridiculous, the pleasure is uncertain, and the expense is damnable." More specifically, the antidumping remedies are longwinded in their employment, uncertain in their effect, and selective in their
application. They also can be positively damaging to innocent parties, as I
think unbiased parties might agree on considering, say, the Algoma case.
Without going into the situation too deeply, I would suggest that the
general threat of action posed by the North American TPM systems and the
Davignon Plan has been more effective in curbing imports from Third World
countries than half a hundred antidumping actions. (Do I hear the hiss of a
thousand quills leaping from their ink wells in deadly protest at such a suggestion at this lawyers' conference? Maybe, maybe.) In any event, I would admit that the willingness of the Japanese to draw in their horns at the time
when Canada and the United States introduced TPM was a significant factor
in securing a favorable outcome-as was the upturn of the United States
market. In Europe, however, the Davignon Plan has been widely recognised
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as successful, especially where stiffened by unilateral action againstthe Soviet
bloc. Of course I do not mean to suggest that the problems of competitive
trading have been resolved. In the ECSC, for instance, I have already mentioned that, for political reasons, West Germany has been unwilling to put
pressure on the Soviet bloc countries to agree to voluntary quotas on an ECSC
basis, forcihng the United Kingdom, for one, to threaten very tough action to
secure unilateral agreements. In the United States, however, I gather that a
number of antidumping actions have been abandoned as plaintiffs begin to
appreciate the virtues of TPM. I mention the National and Georgetown
cases. I also understand that other actions may well be abandoned, although
the disappointing July 1978 trade figures may lead to third thoughts in the
United States. TPM also is said to be even more successful in Canada than in
the United States, partly because it is less specific.
It remains to be seen however, whether the will exists to take advantage
of the improvement in the situation to carry out reforms of the industries in
the ECSC and the United States which are necessary if they are to be able to
compete effectively with the Japanese in their own markets without protection. Such reform is probably easier in the United States, where the industry
has already shown itself willing to slim down-losing over 100,000 jobs in the
period 1965 to 1976 and the difficulty is mainly one of financing the
necessary investment. The Solomon Report was of the opinion that the industry could generate the necessary funds, given protection from low-priced
imports and a more favorable tax regime. (Against this however, I must draw
your attention to the doubts expressed by the President's Council on Wage
and Price Stability as to whether the United States industry could ever
become as efficient as the Japanese, given the continuation of the recession.)
In the ECSC however, the industry stands to lose over 200,000 jobs, as well as
undertaking substantial investment in more modern capacity, and the former
requirement creates an immense obstacle to reform, as any student of the
lamentable fortunes of the British Steel Corporation in recent years will
realise. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that without permanent protection-which would be a monstrous admission of failure-bulk steelmaking in
the ECSC will have to slim down voluntarily or be cut down by the effect of
foreign competition.
The problems of reforming the European and North American industries
would be greatly eased by an upturn in the world market. In this context the
present improvement in the United States market seems most encouraging. It
would be unwise, however, to look for any sustained improvement.
Economic growth in the Free World is likely to continue slower than before
the energy crisis, and is also likely to be less steel-intensive than in the past. The
ECSC also will have to accept that the consequences of the increase in productive capacity in the smaller OECD countries and some industrially advanced
Third World regions will mean a permanent reduction in traditional export
markets, whatever the future pattern of demand. The necessity for rationalisation and modernisation cannot be avoided in the ECSC; in the
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United States, the industry has already been greatly trimmed down and
modernisation seems to be the major requirement.
Antidumping measures constitute only a limited response to the problems
facing the ECSC and North American steel industries. The TPM systems and
the Davignon Plan were introduced to meet a desperate situation and, for
one reason or another, they have enjoyed a fair measure of success. The
breathing space must be used, however, to create a climate in which these industries can reform and restructure themselves, to face a situation which has
undergone permanent and radical change in a very short time. The worst
thing that could happen would be for these industries to become addicted to
protection, demanding tougher and tougher measures. This would lead to the
creation of permanent steel curtains, behind which European and American
manufacturing industry would be cut off from the cheapest sources of a basic
raw material, with all that that implies for their competitiveness in the world
market, and the European and American steel industries would become insulated from the best-known stimuli to the efficient fulfilment of their
economic functions.

